U.S. Failed to Act on Warnings in '98 of a Plane Attack

By JAMES RISEN
From The New York Times
2002

The United States intelligence community was told in 1998 that Arab terrorists were planning to fly a bomb-laden plane into the World Trade Center, but the F.B.I. and the Federal Aviation Administration did not take the threat seriously, a Congressional investigation into the Sept. 11 attacks has found.

That August 1998 intelligence report from the Central Intelligence Agency was just one of several warnings the United States received, but did not seriously analyze, in the years leading up to the Sept. 11 attacks that were detailed today at a Congressional hearing.

The existence of the 1998 intelligence report was disclosed in a presentation by the committee's staff director, Eleanor Hill. The report concluded that there was evidence of a growing interest by Al Qaeda and related groups in high-profile attacks inside the United States years before the attacks on the trade center and the Pentagon. The Congressional report was the first disclosure that there was specific intelligence about terrorist plans to crash airplanes into the trade center, though officials said that those plans did not appear to be connected to the Sept. 11 attack.

And while the joint committee made public several intelligence reports that had been received in the years before Sept. 11 that related to Al Qaeda's intentions to launch an attack inside the United States and its interest in using aircraft for terrorism, Ms. Hill emphasized that the joint committee had still not found a "smoking gun" that could have helped prevent the Sept. 11 attacks. "People have said there was no smoking gun," Ms. Hill said. "But there was still a lot out there that was never pulled together."

In fact, from 1998 to the summer of 2001, the C.I.A., the F.B.I. and other agencies repeatedly received reports of Al Qaeda's interest in attacking Washington and New York, either with airplanes or other means. The threat level grew so high that by December 1998, the director of central intelligence, George J. Tenet, issued a "declaration of war" on Al Qaeda, in a memorandum circulated in the intelligence community. Yet, Ms. Hill said, the intelligence agencies failed to adequately follow up on the declaration, and by Sept. 10, 2001, the F.B.I. still had only one analyst assigned full time to Al Qaeda.

The 1998 intelligence report about the trade center cited plans by a group of unidentified Arabs, who the United States now believes had ties to Al Qaeda, to fly an explosives-laden plane from a foreign country into the trade center. American intelligence officials said today that despite the similarities, they did not believe that the 1998 report was related to the Sept. 11 attack.

Still, the Congressional panel criticized the way in which the intelligence was handled, particularly by the F.B.I. and aviation agency. The committee said the F.B.I.'s New York office "took no action on the information." The flight agency, meanwhile, "found the plot highly unlikely," because of the state of the unidentified foreign country's aviation program.

"We did review the technical aspects of the information, but any decisions about whether it was credible was based on an F.B.I. determination," a spokesman for the Transportation Department said. Law enforcement officials said the F.B.I.'s conclusion that the threat was not credible was based on the seeming difficulty of launching the attack from the unidentified country.

Recent months have seen a flood of reports concerning what kind of information intelligence agencies had about plans for a terrorist attack on the United States. For example, it has already been reported that in 1996, a Pakistani terrorist, Abdul Hakim Murad, confessed to federal agents that he was learning to fly an aircraft in order to crash a plane into the C.I.A. headquarters. It was disclosed in June that the National Security Agency had intercepted two cryptic communications the day before the Sept. 11 attacks. One indicated that "the big match" was scheduled for the next day; the other referred to Sept. 11 as "zero hour." Some officials say it was not clear the messages related to the Sept. 11 attacks. Agency analysts did not translate them until Sept. 12.

Still, today's disclosures provide the most detailed official description of intelligence lapses. While that August 1998 report most closely paralleled the final attack, the C.I.A. received other warnings in that period of Al Qaeda's interest in using aircraft against targets in United States.

In September 1998, intelligence agencies obtained information warning that Osama bin Laden's next major operation could involve flying an aircraft loaded with explosives into an American airport and then detonating it. That same fall, another intelligence report stated that there was a Qaeda plot in the works that involved the use of aircraft in both New York and Washington.

Yet the reports did not prompt the C.I.A. or other intelligence agencies to conduct an analysis of that specific threat to American aviation, the joint committee found. In addition, the aviation agency did not change its traditional assumptions that airplane hijackings were not suicide missions. American airlines directed their flight crews not to fight back against hijackers.

But the reports of Al Qaeda's interest in attacks in the United States extended beyond aircraft. In the spring of 1999, the C.I.A. received another report that Mr. bin Laden wanted to attack a government building in Washington.

In August 1999, another report said Al Qaeda had apparently chosen the secretary of state, the defense secretary and the C.I.A. director for assassination. The C.I.A. had been told the previous year that Mr. bin Laden and his lieutenants had also agreed to issue $9 million bounties for the assassination of four top intelligence officers, whom the report did not identify, after the United increased a reward for Mr. bin Laden.

In the spring and summer of 2001, American intelligence picked up several reports that strongly indicated that Al Qaeda intended a major attack against American targets. Since Sept. 11, American intelligence officials have said that most of that intelligence suggested that the attack was to be overseas.

Still, there were some reports in that period that referred to domestic attacks, the joint committee revealed in its interim report released today. In April 2001, an individual with terrorist connections speculated that Mr. bin Laden would be interested in using commercial pilots as terrorists. The individual warned that Al Qaeda wanted to mount "spectacular and traumatic" attacks like the first bombing of the trade center in 1993.

The C.I.A. first created a unit inside its counterterrorism center to track Mr. bin Laden in 1996. But the joint committee's report strongly suggests that it was not until 1998 that officials throughout the F.B.I., C.I.A. and other agencies began to recognize the urgent threat posed by Al Qaeda, after the August 1998 bombings of two American embassies in East Africa.

The response of intelligence agencies to the Qaeda threat varied widely. On Dec. 4, 1998, Mr. Tenet issued his declaration of war, saying, "I want no resource or people spared." Yet the joint committee found that few of the F.B.I. agents interviewed by it had ever heard of Mr. Tenet's declaration. The panel also concluded that prior to Sept. 11, only one F.B.I. analyst was assigned full time to Al Qaeda, although others were working on individual terrorist cases related to Mr. bin Laden's network. The joint committee report also said that in 1999, the C.I.A.'s counterterrorism center had only three analysts assigned full time to Al Qaeda.

Both the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. disputed those figures today. Law enforcement officials said the committee's numbers were misleading, because at the time of last year's attacks, the F.B.I.'s Al Qaeda analysts were not assigned to a separate analytical section, but to two operational groups with about 30 people.


Before Sept. 11, there were hints from overseas that something was afoot

By Paul Haven
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

A plan to crash a plane into CIA headquarters was exposed after an arrest in the Philippines. A meeting of future Sept. 11 hijackers aroused suspicion in Malaysia. Information that al-Qaida was seeking to assassinate President George W. Bush at a summit in Europe led to heightened security.

Clues filtering in from overseas since at least 1994 foreshadowed Osama bin Laden's plans to attack America, and intelligence information from Italy, Israel and elsewhere in the months before Sept. 11 warned that a terrorist strike might be imminent. The White House acknowledged Thursday that Bush was briefed by the CIA on Aug. 6 about an al-Qaida hijacking threat. An earlier report by the Phoenix field office of the FBI that may never have reached the president's desk warned that many Middle Eastern men were training at least one U.S. flight school.

Officials in the Bush administration said the information was not specific and there was no intelligence before Sept. 11 that al-Qaida planned to use commercial planes as vessels of destruction. "I don't think anybody could have predicted that these people would take an airplane and slam it into the World Trade Center, take another one and slam it into the Pentagon; that they would try to use an airplane as a missile, a hijacked airplane as a missile," National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice said Thursday.

But warning signs that something like Sept. 11 might be contemplated weren't all recent — and they came from different sources around the world.

Clues early as 1994
In 1994, Algerian militants hijacked an Air France jetliner and killed three passengers before being captured during a stop in Marseilles. It came out that they had hoped to blow up the jet over the Eiffel Tower, debunking the notion that a suicidal airline attack on a prominent target was unthinkable before Sept. 11.

Perhaps the first clue of a similar plot against the United States emerged during the Clinton administration in 1995, when Philippine authorities arrested Ramzi Yousef and Abdul Hakim Murad after a chemical fire at their Manila apartment. Under questioning, Murad admitted connections to bin Laden and spoke of a plot to dive-bomb a jetliner into the CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. He also said Middle Eastern pilots were training at U.S. flight schools in preparation for a plot to blow up 12 passenger jets over the Pacific Ocean.

The FBI was alerted at the time and interviewed flight school attendees, but it did not develop evidence that any of the Middle Easterners were plotting terrorism.

FBI and other law enforcement officials involved in the Murad investigation, who spoke earlier this year on the condition of anonymity, said American authorities were focused mostly on the plot to blow up the airplanes because it was developed and imminent when Murad and Yousef were arrested. The plan to use a plane as a weapon largely was discounted. Yousef, considered the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and Murad eventually were convicted in the United States and sentenced to life in prison.

Larry Johnson, deputy director of the State Department's office of counterterrorism in 1989-93, criticized Rice for discounting the possibility that a Sept. 11-type attack could have been foreseen. "She's foolish in saying that. Intelligence analysts are paid to imagine the unimaginable. That information was in their files, and if they weren't imagining it, that is a failure of intelligence and a failure of imagination," he said.

More red flags in 2000
Another clue to Sept. 11 came in 2000, and it was partially a result of the 1995 Philippine investigation. The investigation of Murad and Yousef led authorities to a radical Indonesian cleric, Riduan Isamuddin, who was living in Malaysia and was suspected of deep ties to al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations.

The cleric, who goes by the name Hambali, was under surveillance in January 2000 when he met with two future Sept. 11 hijackers — Saudi nationals Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi — in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian authorities have said.

Information from the surveillance was shared with U.S. authorities, and the meeting took on new significance when another of the participants, an unidentified al-Qaida operative from the Middle East, became wanted in connection with the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole.

The two Saudis were not on the intelligence community's radar screens at the time, but their connections to Hambali and the al-Qaida operative wanted in the Cole investigation got them placed on a CIA terrorist watch list in August 2001 — one month before they helped commandeer the American Airlines jetliner that crashed into the Pentagon on Sept. 11.

The investigation into Hambali also has linked the cleric to another alleged Sept. 11 player, Zacarias Moussaoui, who is on trial in U.S. District Court in Virginia and faces the death penalty if convicted of conspiracy in the attacks.

Two of Hambali's followers, Yazid Sufaat and his wife, Sejahratul Dursina, are under arrest in Malaysia — Sufaat in connection with a plot to blow up the U.S. Embassy in neighboring Singapore and Dursina for allegedly providing Moussaoui with an employment letter that helped him get the U.S. visa. Moussaoui was arrested on a visa violation in August after raising suspicions during flight training in Minnesota. French intelligence was aware of Moussaoui as early as 1999, when he was placed on a watch-list for alleged links to the Armed Islamic Group, which claimed responsibility for 1995 bombings in the Paris subway. Whether that information was shared with U.S. officials is not clear, and Moussaoui was granted a U.S. visa to train as a pilot in the United States.

Signs of plans for major strike
In addition to intelligence about specific Sept. 11 participants, there were signs last summer that al-Qaida was planning a major strike. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said his country passed along information to Washington about a possible threat on President Bush's life at the Group of 8 summit in Genoa, Italy, after a June 13 video made by bin Laden.

Italy closed Genoa's airspace and mounted a short-range, anti-aircraft battery at the airport during the July 20-22 summit, Deputy Premier Gianfranco Fini said. "Islamic extremists were said to be trying to hit Bush in the air," Fini said.

Another clue of terrorist rumblings came from Djamel Beghal, a 35-year-old French-Algerian arrested in Dubai last July with a false passport. Under questioning, Beghal detailed an al-Qaida plot to blow up U.S. interests in Europe, including the American Embassy in Paris.

Beghal said he met bin Laden operatives at mosques in Britain, traveled to Afghanistan for weapons training at an al-Qaida camp, and met at bin Laden's home with his top aide, Abu Zubaydah. European authorities began looking into the plot on Sept. 10.

Israeli intelligence services were aware several months before Sept. 11 that bin Laden was planning a large-scale terror attack, but did not know what his targets would be, Israeli officials have said.

An Israeli official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told THE ASSOCIATED PRESS shortly after the attacks that "everybody knew about a heightened alert, and knew that bin Laden was preparing a big attack." He said information was passed on to Washington, but denied Israel had any concrete intelligence that could have been used to prevent the Sept. 11 attacks.

The final sign that something was afoot may have come Sept. 9, when suspected bin Laden operatives posing as journalists assassinated Gen. Ahmed Shah Massood, leader of Afghanistan's anti-Taliban northern alliance, in a suicide attack at his headquarters. U.S. officials have speculated the killing was designed to deprive the northern alliance of its boldest and most experienced leader just days before attacks on New York and Washington that bin Laden must have known would prompt a U.S. response against his Taliban hosts.

Associated Press reporters Jamey Keaten in Paris and Dafna Linzer in Jerusalem contributed to this story.


Oil wars Pentagon's policy since 1999

By Ritt Goldstein
From smh.com
2003

A top-level United States policy document has emerged that explicitly confirms the Defence Department's readiness to fight an oil war.

According to the report, Strategic Assessment 1999, prepared for the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defence, "energy and resource issues will continue to shape international security". Oil conflicts over production facilities and transport routes, particularly in the Persian Gulf and Caspian regions, are specifically envisaged.

Although the policy does not forecast imminent US military conflict, it vividly highlights how the highest levels of the US Defence community accepted the waging of an oil war as a legitimate military option.

Strategic Assessment also forecasts that if an oil "problem" arises, "US forces might be used to ensure adequate supplies".

Although Strategic Assessment 1999 predicts adequate US energy supplies, it also finds that supply shortages could "exacerbate regional political tensions, potentially causing regional conflicts".

The Bush Administration has stated that providing for US energy needs is a priority. Strategic Assessment was prepared by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, part of the US Department of Defence's National Defence University. The institute lists its primary mission as policy research and analysis for the Joint Chiefs, the Defence Secretary, and a variety of government security and defence bodies.

According to the report, national security depends on successful engagement in the global economy, so national defence no longer means protecting the nation from military threats alone, but economic challenges, too.

The fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s brought an end to the US's ideological basis for potential conflict. In 1992 Bill Clinton urged that "our economic strength must become a central defining element of our national security policy". Since then, members of the Bush Administration have promoted the need for the consolidation of the Cold War victory.

In what many may see as an apparent parallel to present events, Strategic Assessment 1999 drew attention to pre-World War II Britain's pursuit of an approach where control over territory was seen as essential to ensuring resource supplies. However, the Defence Department policymakers behind Strategic Assessment also appear to recognise the potential consequences of such policies.

The authors warn that if the great powers return to the 19th century approach of securing resources, of conquering resource suppliers, the world economy will suffer and world politics will become more tense.




U.S. Could've Stopped 9/11 Attacks, Panel Chief Says

By KIRK SEMPLE
From The New York Times
2004

The terrorist strikes of Sept. 11, 2001, could have been prevented had the United States government acted sooner to dismantle Al Qaeda and responded more quickly to other terrorist threats, the chairman of the commission investigating the attacks said today, even as the White House sought to dispel the notion that the attacks were avoidable.

Thomas H. Kean, chairman of the commission and former Republican governor of New Jersey, said that had the United States seized early opportunities to kill Osama bin Laden in the years before Sept. 11, "the whole story would've been different."

Mr. Kean's comments on the NBC News program "Meet the Press" echoed statements he made in December and January. But he emphatically declared that additional months of testimony and investigation had not altered his view.

"What we've found now on the commission has not changed that belief because there were so many threads and so many things, individual things, that happened," he said. "And if some of those things hadn't happened the way they happened," the attacks could have been prevented.

His comments came four days before President Bush's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, was scheduled to testify before the commission, which is investigating the circumstances surrounding Sept. 11 and scrutinizing the actions of both the Bush and Clinton administrations. Last week President Bush bowed to political pressure and agreed to allow Ms. Rice to testify.

The White House has insisted there was nothing that could have been done to prevent the Sept. 11 attacks. The White House spokesman Scott McClellan said last month that charges by Richard Clark, Mr. Bush's former terrorism chief, that the administration could have done more to prevent the attacks were "deeply irresponsible," "offensive," and "flat-out false." Ms. Rice, in an interview on the CBS News program "60 Minutes" last week, insisted that the Bush administration regarded terrorism as "an urgent problem" before Sept. 11. "I would like very much to know what more could have been done given that it was an urgent problem," she said.

Karen P. Hughes, a top political adviser to President Bush, reinforced that position in an appearance today on "Meet the Press."

"I don't believe that anyone in the Bush administration — and I'm not an advocate of the Clinton administration, but I'll even include them in this — I don't believe that anyone in the Clinton administration either could have put together the pieces before the horror of Sept. 11," Ms. Hughes said. "I don't think we could have envisioned it and done anything to perhaps prevented it."

The panel's vice chairman, Lee H. Hamilton, who appeared alongside Mr. Kean this morning on NBC, was more circumspect than his colleague on the issue of inevitability. "You can string together a whole bunch of ifs," said Mr. Hamilton, a former Democratic House member from Indiana. "If things had broken right in all kinds of different ways as the governor has identified and many more, and frankly, if you'd had a little luck, it could probably have been prevented."

The commission officials said they expected to finish their report by July. By law, they said, they have to submit the document to the White House for review before it is publicly released to ensure that it contains nothing that would compromise national security.

"They go through it line by line," Mr. Kean said. Both men acknowledged that the law gives the White House exclusive control over the release of intelligence information, but Mr. Hamilton insisted the panel would not permit the White House to "distort" the report.

"We do not want to put out a report with heavy redactions in it," he said. Mr. Kean said he was confident that the White House would complete its review quickly in order to permit the report's public release well in advance of the presidential election in November. "I think it's in the White House's interest, our interest, everybody's interest to get this out in July," he said.

Presidents Bush and Clinton and Vice Presidents Dick Cheney and Al Gore are scheduled to appear before the commission. But while Mr. Clinton and Mr. Gore are going to appear separately, Mr. Bush and Mr. Cheney will appear together, an arrangement that has drawn criticism from some Democratic leaders. Mr. Kean said the members of the panel "don't see any problems with it," though he allowed that "maybe we would have rather had them one at a time."

While the dates that Mr. Bush, Mr. Clinton, Mr. Cheney and Mr. Gore have not been publicly announced, Ms. Rice is scheduled to testify on Thursday. Mr. Kean said he expected her testimony, scheduled for two and a half hours, to reveal "what she heard and what she knew," and to shed light on the differences between the policies of the Bush administration and the policies of the Clinton administration.

Madeleine K. Albright, President Bill Clinton's secretary of state, insisted this morning on the ABC News program "This Week" that with the Bush administration "there was kind of a dismissal of everything that the Clinton administration had done" to combat terrorism. "We were working very hard on this issue," she added.

John F. Lehman, Navy secretary in the Reagan administration and a Republican member of the commission, said today that he viewed Ms. Rice's testimony as "much more important" than either Mr. Bush's or Mr. Cheney's.

"She was right at the nexus 24 hours a day," he explained on the CBS News program "Face the Nation." "She was the conduit to the president and the coordinator of national security policy." He added: "She really has the view that we need to establish the facts."



The Failure to Defend the Skies on 9/11(excerpt)

By Paul Thompson
FromThe Center for Cooperative Research

In his May 2003 testimony, Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta stated to the Independent Commission, “I don’t think we ever thought of an aircraft being used as a missile. We had no information of that nature at all.” [Norman Mineta Testimony, 5/23/03] FAA Administrator Jane Garvey said, “I was not aware of any information about (planes) being used as weapons that was credible.” [UPI, 5/22/03 (B)] Mineta and Garvey were merely repeating the same claims many Bush administration officials have made since 9/11. For instance, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice stated in May 2002, “All this reporting about hijacking was about traditional hijacking.” [Washington Post 9/18/02] Even President Bush stated, “Never did anybody’s thought process about how to protect America did we ever think that the evil-doers would fly not one, but four commercial aircraft into precious US targets—never.” [NATO, 9/16/01]

Careful examination of the published record clearly shows these claims there were no warnings are simply not true. Historically there have been many attacks using planes as weapons, an obvious example being the kamikaze strikes by Japanese pilots on Allied ships in World War II. More recently, in 1994, there were three separate attempts to hijack airplanes and fly them into buildings. A disgruntled Federal Express worker tried to crash a DC-10 into a company building in Memphis but was overpowered by the crew.A lone pilot crashed a small plane onto the White House grounds, just missing the president’s bedroom.An Air France flight was hijacked by a terrorist group linked to al-Qaeda, with the aim of flying it into the Eiffel Tower; however, French Special Forces stormed the plane while it was refueling.[New York Times, 10/3/01]

Numerous foreign governments warned the US that it was likely to be attacked by airplanes used as weapons. In 1999, the British warned that al-Qaeda had plans to use “commercial aircraft” in “unconventional ways, possibly as flying bombs.” [Sunday Times, 6/9/02] In early August 2001, Britain gave a categorical warning that the US should expect multiple airline hijackings. This warning was passed on to Bush a short time later. [Sunday Herald, 5/19/02] In June 2001, Germany warned that Middle Eastern terrorists were planning to hijack commercial aircraft and use them as weapons to attack “American and Israeli symbols, which stand out.” [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9/11/01, Washington Post, 9/14/01, Fox News, 5/17/02] In August, Russian President Putin warned the US that suicide pilots were training for attacks on US targets. [Fox News, 5/17/02]

In late July 2001, “Egyptian intelligence [learned] ... from one of its operatives in Afghanistan that 20 al-Qaeda members had slipped into the US and four of them had received flight training on Cessnas. To the Egyptians, pilots of small planes didn’t sound terribly alarming, but they passed on the message to the CIA anyway, fully expecting Washington to request information. The request never came.” [CBS, 10/9/02] This closely matches the details of the actual 9/11 plot, with its four pilots who trained on Cessnas. Around the end of August, Egyptian intelligence followed up with a warning that al-Qaeda was in the advanced stages of executing a significant operation against an American target, probably within the US. [AP, 12/7/01, New York Times, 6/4/02] Jordan passed on the message that a major attack, code named the “Big Wedding,” was planned inside the US and that aircraft would be used.[International Herald Tribune, 5/21/02, Christian Science Monitor, 5/23/02] “Big Wedding” was in fact al-Qaeda’s secret code name for the 9/11 attacks. [Chicago Tribune, 9/5/02]

Israel went even further, warning in mid-August 2001 that between 50 to 200 al-Qaeda terrorists had slipped into the US and were planning an imminent, “major assault on the United States.” They said it was likely to be on a “large scale target” (the CIA has denied this warning). [Telegraph, 9/16/01, Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01, Fox News, 5/17/02] On August 23, Israel even gave the CIA a list of 19 terrorists living in the US who were about to stage an attack. It’s not known if these were the exact same 19 hijackers as in the 9/11 attack, but at least four of the names on the list were the same: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, and Mohamed Atta. [Die Zeit, 10/1/02, Der Spiegel, 10/1/02, BBC, 10/2/02, Haaretz, 10/3/02] Apparently Israeli agents had been monitoring the hijackers inside the US for months. For instance, beginning in December 2000, agents lived a few blocks from Marwan Alshehhi and Mohamed Atta, and observed them “around the clock.” [Salon, 5/7/02, Der Spiegel, 10/1/02]

An al-Qaeda Attack Expected Within the US
Bush officials, when admitting that any warnings were known at all, have suggested that most intelligence information pointed toward overseas attacks only. FAA Director Jane Garvey repeated this in her May 2003 testimony, saying attention “was focused on threats overseas.” [UPI, 5/22/03 (B)] But even this is not true—many of the foreign government warnings mentioned above pointed to attacks in the US, and there was much more evidence that the target was inside the US.

In the autumn of 1998, US intelligence heard of an al-Qaeda plot involving aircraft in the New York and Washington areas. [Senate Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02, New York Times, 9/18/02] Around this time bin Laden declared a worldwide fatwa, or religious call to arms, against US targets and American citizens anywhere in the world. By December, a US intelligence assessment stated, “Multiple reports indicate bin Laden is keenly interested in striking the US on its own soil.” [Senate Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02, Washington Post, 9/19/02] Later in the month a Time magazine cover story, entitled “The Hunt for Osama,” reported that intelligence sources had “evidence that bin Laden may be planning his boldest move yet—a strike on Washington or possibly New York City...” [Time, 12/21/98]

In July 1999, an agent of Pakistan’s intelligence service, in the US to buy illegal weapons for al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, pointed to the World Trade Center and stated, “Those towers are coming down.” An FBI informant recorded him saying this and similar threats against that building on two other occasions. This information reached higher officials, including the office of Senator Bob Graham, who was chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. [WPBF Channel 25, 8/5/02, Cox News, 8/2/02, Palm Beach Post, 10/17/02]

In September, US intelligence learned of a planned al-Qaeda attack in the US, possibly against landmarks in California and New York City. [Senate Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02] Two months later, in December 1999, an al-Qaeda bomb attack on the Los Angeles International Airport was narrowly averted. Ahmed Ressam was arrested by an alert Washington state border guard who noticed his nervousness. [New York Times, 12/30/01] Documents found with Ressam led to co-conspirators in New York, Boston and Seattle. Enough people were arrested to prevent a series of attacks planned for December 31, 1999. National Security Council Chief of Counterterrorism Richard Clarke later said that as a result, “I think a lot of the FBI leadership for the first time realized that ... there probably were al-Qaeda people in the United States.” [PBS Frontline, 10/3/02]

In April 2000, a man walked into the FBI office in Newark, New Jersey, and claimed he had received hijacking training at an al-Qaeda camp in Pakistan. He also stated that he was supposed to meet five or six other individuals in the US and participate in the hijacking of a 747. Pilots in the hijacking team would either fly the plane to Afghanistan or blow it up. The individual passed an FBI polygraph, but the FBI was unable to verify his story or identify his contacts in the US. [Senate Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02]

In late July 2001, Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, foreign minister for the Taliban, tried to warn the US that al-Qaeda was planning a “huge attack” on targets inside America. The attack was imminent, and would kill thousands. His message was told to US officials, but it is unclear how far the warning was passed along. [Independent, 9/7/02, Reuters, 9/7/02] Then, according to a CIA official, “There was something specific in early August that said to us that [bin Laden] was determined in striking on US soil.” [AP, 10/3/01] “Shortly before” 9/11, there was even an intercept of a conversation between Osama bin Laden and an associate talking about an incident to take place in the US on or around 9/11, and its implications. [Sunday Times, 10/7/01]

War Games Prepare for 9/11
In truth, the US government seemed quite concerned the possibility of an attack using a plane as a weapon. For example, on October 24-26, 2000,Pentagon officials carried out a “detailed” emergency drill based upon the crashing of an airliner into the Pentagon. [MDW News Service, 11/3/00, Mirror, 5/24/02] Also, US Medicine magazine reported that in May 2001, “DoD [Department of Defense] medical personnel trained” to respond to “an ersatz guided missile in the form of a hijacked 757 airliner” crashing into the Pentagon. [US Medicine, 10/01] On June 1-2, 2001, NORAD sponsored a multi-agency planning exercise named Amalgam Virgo involving the hypothetical scenario of a cruise missile launched by “a rogue (government) or somebody” from a barge off the East Coast. Bin Laden was pictured on the cover of the proposal for the exercise. [American Forces Press Service, 6/4/02] Before 9/11, it was already planned that the next year’s version of Amalgam Virgo would involve a simultaneous hijacking scenario. [NORAD Testimony, 5/23/03] Additionally, at some point before 9/11, NORAD conducted another drill, in which a hijacked plane slammed into a highly visible US target. Details of this drill are not known, except that it involved a plane hijacked from a foreign airport. [AP, 10/7/01]

Remarkably, on the morning of 9/11 itself, “ [John] Fulton and his team at the CIA were running a pre-planned simulation to explore the emergency response issues that would be created if a plane were to strike a building. Little did they know that the scenario would come true in a dramatic way that day.” [National Law Enforcement Security Institute, 8/02] Fulton’s team was part of the National Reconnaissance Office, which “operates many of the nation’s spy satellites. It draws its personnel from the military and the CIA.” The simulation was to start at 9:00 a.m., four miles from where one of the real hijacked planes had just taken off. Apparently it was cancelled when real events took over. [AP, 8/21/02] Also on 9/11, NORAD was in the middle of another periodic war game, this one called Vigilant Guardian. Details are vague, except that the scenario tested “an imaginary crisis to North American Air Defense outposts nationwide” [Newhouse News, 1/25/02], and according to one NORAD employee, “everybody” at NORAD initially thought the real hijackings were part of the exercise. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02, Newhouse News, 1/25/02, ABC News, 9/11/02]

The above is only a partial listing of all the information that should have alerted the Bush administration to the nature of the 9/11 attack. For instance, one could also go into detail about the failure to appreciate FBI agent Ken Williams’s July 2001 memo warning of al-Qaeda agents training in US flight schools, or the failure to follow up on the August 15, 2001, arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui which led one flight school official to complain to FBI agents, “Do you realize how serious this is? This man wants training on a 747. A 747 fully loaded with fuel could be used as a weapon!” [New York Times, 2/8/02] There were numerous additional warnings suggesting targets like the World Trade Center and indicating exactly when the attacks would happen.

It’s no wonder the Bush administration has refused to allow most of the findings of the 2002 9/11 Congressional Inquiry to be made public, and has repeatedly attempted to prevent any serious investigation into 9/11. [Newsweek, 4/30/03, Newsweek, 2/4/02] Stunningly, the administration now wants material that has already been made public to be reclassified. The Congressional Inquiry was not allowed to reveal which warnings reached which officials. Its final 800-page report—still being withheld—is said to “name names” regarding who was told what. For instance, it apparently says that one CIA briefing from July 2001 was presented to Bush. That briefing predicted that al-Qaeda would launch a terrorist strike “in the coming weeks.” It added, “Attack will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties against US facilities or interests. Attack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning.” [Newsweek, 4/30/03]

If that briefing wasn’t enough to cause concern for the president, the very title of the CIA’s daily briefing to Bush on August 6, 2001, “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US,” should have. This also was kept from the public until someone leaked it to the press in May 2002. The entire memo focused on the possibility of terrorist attacks inside the US. Some accounts claim it was 11 pages long, instead of the usual two or three pages. [Newsweek, 5/27/02, New York Times, 5/15/02, Die Zeit, 10/1/02] Its contents have never been released. However, a Congressional report later described what is likely this memo. Supposedly, it mentions “that members of al-Qaeda, including some US citizens, had resided in or traveled to the US for years and that the group apparently maintained a support structure here. The report cited uncorroborated information obtained in 1998 that Osama bin Laden wanted to hijack airplanes to gain the release of US-held extremists; FBI judgments about patterns of activity consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks and the number of bin Laden-related investigations underway; as well as information acquired in May 2001 that indicated a group of bin Laden supporters was planning attacks in the US with explosives.” [Senate Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02]

What Preparations?
So given all these warnings, and undoubtedly many more that have not been made public, wouldn’t one naturally think the US government would have taken basic steps to guard against hijackings? Even forgetting planes as flying bombs, what about defenses against traditional hijackings? Transportation Secretary Mineta was asked at the May 2003 hearing, “Did this higher level of [terrorist] chatter ... result in any action across the government? I take it your answer is no.” He replied, “That’s correct.” [AP, 5/23/03 (C)]

In fact, rather than strengthening defenses, there actually were suggestions to weaken the country’s defenses even further. Supposedly, in 1997, the number of fighters on 24-hour active alert defending the continental US was reduced from about 100 fighters to only 14. And in the months before 9/11, the Pentagon was planning to reduce that number still further! “While defense officials say a decision had not yet been made [by 9/11], a reduction in air defenses had been gaining currency in recent months among task forces assigned by [Defense Secretary] Rumsfeld...” [Los Angeles Times, 9/15/01 (B)] Additionally, several months before, the FAA had tried to dispense with “primary” radars altogether and only use radars that detect transponder signals. Had that happened, when the hijackers turned off the planes’ transponder signals, no radar would have been able to find them. Luckily, NORAD rejected the proposal. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02]

Furthermore, despite all of the threats made against prominent landmarks, especially those in Washington and New York City, no steps appear to have been taken to better defend logical attack targets or these cities generally. For instance, there had long been a surface-to-air missile battery on top of the White House. [Telegraph, 9/16/01] Such batteries were not set up in New York City or anywhere else, in the way that the Italian government did to protect Genoa in July 2001. Nor were fighters kept in the skies as they were over recent Olympic Games, despite the high probability that bin Laden was determined to strike inside the US [to paraphrase the title of Bush’s August 6 briefing] within a matter of weeks. In fact, the nearest military base with fighters on alert was 188 miles from New York City, and 129 miles from Washington. The fighters at Andrews Air Force Base, only 10 miles from the center of Washington, were not put on a higher alert status, as far as we know.

Bush’s national security leadership held about 100 meetings between the January 2001 inauguration and 9/11, but terrorism was discussed in only two of these meetings (on June 3 and September 4). [Washington Post, 5/17/02] By comparison, Clinton’s Counterterrorism Security Group of similar stature met two or three times a week between 1998 and 2000. [New York Times, 12/30/01] And on August 22, 2001, FBI agent John O’Neill, the government’s “most committed tracker of Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network of terrorists” [New Yorker, 1/14/02], quit after a critical article about him was published in the New York Times. O’Neill believed interim FBI Director Tom Pickard orchestrated the article as part of an effort to remove him, because the incoming FBI Director Robert Mueller wanted O’Neill replaced with a Bush ally. [PBS Frontline, 10/3/02, New Yorker, 1/14/02] O’Neill was killed in the 9/11 attacks.

The FAA sent 15 general terrorist warnings to US airlines between January and August 2001. But airlines had been receiving at least one such warning a month for a long time. [CNN, 3/02, CNN, 5/17/02] As one newspaper later put it, “There were so many that airline officials grew numb to them.” [St. Petersburg Times, 9/23/02] The Bush administration officials acknowledged that these warnings were so vague that they did not require tighter airline security. [AP, 5/18/02] In late June 2001,Richard Clarke, the White House National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, did give a direct warning to the FAA to increase security measures in light of an impending terrorist attack.But the FAA refused to take such measures, and nothing was done about its refusal.[New Yorker, 1/14/02]

The Response to the 9/11 Hijackings
With this background understanding of the numerous warnings given and a complete lack of protective measures taken, we can now turn to the subject of the May 2003 Independent Commission hearings. How effective were the air defenses on 9/11? Not surprisingly, with only 14 fighters on 24-hour active alert, the military was already at an unnecessary disadvantage. But even factoring in such a lack of planes, the defensive response to the hijackings was so remarkably poor that it has caused some to wonder if the hijackers were deliberately allowed to succeed.

Before looking at how the military response to 9/11 fared, we should consider the defensive posture on the East Coast at the time. Officially, there were only two air force bases in the Northeast region that were formally part of NORAD’s defensive system. One was Otis Air National Guard Base on Massachusetts’ Cape Cod peninsula and about 188 miles east of New York City. The other was Langley Air Force Base near Norfolk, Virginia, and about 129 miles south of Washington. [BBC, 8/29/02] During the Cold War, the US had literally thousands of fighters on alert. But as the Cold War wound down, this number was reduced until it reached only 14 fighters in the continental US by 9/11. [Los Angeles Times, 9/15/01 (B)] A cursory web search shows that until recently, many units were on five-minute alert status, which meant that from the moment they were scrambled (ordered into the air), they were guaranteed to be airborne within five minutes. NORAD has claimed that on 9/11 fighters in bases within its system, including Otis and Langley, were guaranteed to get airborne within 15 minutes, not five. [Calgary Herald, 10/13/01, NORAD Testimony, 5/23/03] (Why this reduction in capability happened even as the terrorist threat dramatically increased is another unanswered question.)

These planes within NORAD’s system routinely scrambled after other aircraft. Often the goal was drug interdiction. General Ralph Eberhart, NORAD Commander in Chief, said that before 9/11, “Normally, our units [flew] 4-6 sorties a month in support of the NORAD air defense mission.” [Federal News Service, 10/25/01] In 2000, there were 425 “unknowns”—pilots who didn’t file or diverted from flight plans or used the wrong frequency. Fighters were scrambled in response to 129 of those cases, when problems were not immediately resolved. [Calgary Herald, 10/13/01] Unfortunately, statistics on how many minutes it took for these fighters to get airborne apparently have not been released.

But there are dozens of other air force bases on the East Coast. How quickly other bases could get fighters into the air varied from base to base. Before 9/11, the web sites of many of these bases used terms like “combat ready,”“five minute alert,”“highest state of readiness,” and so on, indicating they should have been able to quickly respond as well. For instance, the web site for Andrews Air Force Base next to Washington boasted that it hosted two “combat ready” squadrons, “capable and ready response forces for the District of Columbia in the event of a natural disaster or civil emergency.” The District of Columbia Air National Guard was stationed at Andrews, and its web site claimed its mission was “to provide combat units in the highest possible state of readiness.” Both web sites changed on September 12, 2001, and the phrases suggesting such quick response capability were removed. [DC Military website, DCANG Home Page (before and after the change)] Bases at Westfield, Massachusetts; Syracuse, New York; and Hartford, Connecticut, also promised high readiness status, and these bases would have been in good positions to defend the skies on 9/11.

The Morning of September 11, 2001
As the sun rose on September 11, 2001, NORAD was already taking part in the Vigilant Guardian war game, which had begun a few days before. [Newhouse News, 1/25/02, Ottawa Citizen, 9/11/02, Code One Magazine, 1/02] As a result, NORAD was in peak form. It was fully staffed and alert, and senior officers were manning stations throughout the US when the first hijacking was reported. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02] Because of the war game, NORAD “had extra fighter planes on alert.” [ABC News, 9/14/02] Colonel Robert Marr, in charge of NORAD’s Northeastern US sector, said, “We had the fighters with a little more gas on board. A few more weapons on board.” [ABC News, 9/11/02]

American Airlines Flight 11
The location of military bases discussed here have been added onto this map of the flight paths for all four hijacked flights. Flight 11 is the Boston flight that went far north. Flight 175 also left from Boston. Flight 93 left from New York, and precisely followed its intended route until Cleveland. Flight 77 left from Washington. Langley is about 20 miles off the map to the south. [USA Today]

All four of the hijacked planes were scheduled to take off within several minutes of 8:00 a.m., though Flight 93 was delayed on the runway for 40 minutes. Flight 11 from Boston was the first plane to get hijacked. Edited transcripts of the cockpit transmissions show that the last routine communication between Flight 11 and Boston’s air traffic control was at 8:13 a.m. and 47 seconds. [New York Times, 10/16/01 (C)] The loss of communication was quickly noticed—flight controllers can be heard discussing it at 8:15. Furthermore, “just moments” after the radio contact was lost, the transponder was turned off as well. [MSNBC, 9/15/01] The transponder is the electronic device that identifies the jet on the controller’s screen, gives its exact location and altitude, and also allows a four-digit emergency hijack code to be sent. Boston air traffic manager Glenn Michael later said, “We considered [Flight 11] at that time to be a possible hijacking.” [AP, 8/12/02]

Normally, pilots press the ELT (emergency locator transmitter) button as soon as they suspect a hijacking is in progress. This button is within easy reach. However, the pilot of Flight 11, Captain John Ogonowski, did not press this button, and nor did the pilots on Flights 77 and 93. There has been speculation that this may have been because hijackers were already in the cockpits when the hijackings began, posing as a guest pilot sitting in the cockpit’s extra seat. [Fox News, 9/24/01, Boston Globe, 11/23/01] This would explain, for instance, why Flight 11’s radio contact and transponder signal were both lost at about 8:14, while two stewardesses calling from the flight indicated the hijackers in the passenger section didn’t get out of their seats until about 8:21. [Boston Globe, 11/23/01, ABC News, 7/18/02] But Captain Ogonowski was clever. He began turning the talk-back button off and on, which enabled flight controllers to hear what was being said, and also showed them that something was wrong. One controller said, “The button was being pushed intermittently most of the way to New York,” and continued until about 8:38, so he must have started not long after 8:14. [Christian Science Monitor, 9/13/01, MSNBC, 9/15/01]

Flight controllers suspected something was wrong, but perhaps were confused because the ELT button had not been activated. But at 8:20, Flight 11 stopped transmitting its IFF (identify friend or foe) beacon signal [CNN, 9/17/01], and the plane also was clearly off course by that time (see adjacent flight path map). As a result, at “about 8:20” Boston flight control decided that Flight 11 had probably been hijacked. [Newsday, 9/23/01, New York Times, 9/15/01 (C)] However, it did not notify NORAD or anyone else of a possible problem.

This is when the failure of America’s air defense system began. FAA regulations in force at the time state, “Consider that an aircraft emergency exists... when: ... There is unexpected loss of radar contact and radio communications with any... aircraft.” [FAA regulations] They also state, “If... you are in doubt that a situation constitutes an emergency or potential emergency, handle it as though it were an emergency.” [FAA regulations] Furthermore, MSNBC explained that a significant course deviation is “considered a real emergency, like a police car screeching down a highway at 100 miles an hour” and leads to fighters being quickly dispatched to see what the problem might be. [MSNBC, 9/12/01] But, as ABC News later put it, around 8:20, “There doesn’t seem to have been alarm bells going off, traffic controllers getting on with law enforcement or the military. There’s a gap there that will have to be investigated.” [ABC News, 9/14/01]

If there still was any doubt Flight 11 had been hijacked, that doubt was removed at 8:24. Because Captain Ogonowski was periodically holding down the talk-back button, beginning at 8:24 and 38 seconds, Boston flight controllers heard the hijackers in the cockpit broadcasting a message to the passengers: “We have some planes. Just stay quiet and you will be OK. We are returning to the airport.” A flight controller responded, “Who’s trying to call me?” The hijacker continued, “Everything will be OK. If you try to make any moves you’ll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet.” [Guardian, 10/17/01, New York Times, 10/16/01 (C)] A Boston flight controller later said that immediately after hearing this voice, he “knew right then that he was working a hijack.” [Village Voice, 9/13/01] At 8:25 exactly, seconds after hearing this message, Boston flight control notified other flight control centers of the hijacking. But, supposedly, once again it did not notify NORAD. Incredibly, NORAD asserts that it wasn’t told of the hijacking until 8:40—a full 15 minutes later! [NORAD, 9/18/01]

These 15 minutes are vital. As mentioned previously, NORAD guaranteed that its fighters could take off within 15 minutes of being given the order to scramble. It must also have taken a few minutes for NORAD to confirm the situation and pass the word to the pilots. Let’s say this takes five minutes (in actual fact, when Major General Larry Arnold at NORAD’s Command Center in Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, first heard that Flight 11 had been hijacked, he said, “Go ahead and scramble them, and we’ll get the authorities later” [ABC News, 9/11/02], so pilot notification could have happened very quickly). It would then have taken another 15 minutes at most to get the fighters in the air. A NORAD spokeswoman said that fighters from Otis can reach New York City in 10 to 12 minutes. [Cape Cod Times, 9/16/01] So, adding this up, 8:25, plus 5, 15, and 12 minutes, means that the fighters would have reached New York City by 8:57. This would have been too late for Flight 11, which crashed into the World Trade Center at 8:46, but it would have reached New York six minutes before Flight 175, which crashed at 9:03.

Lies and Contradictions
Thus, had the FAA not delayed its notification of NORAD, the approximately 620 people killed in the World Trade Center’s South Tower might have been saved. [New York Magazine, 9/02] Had the FAA reported its suspicions at 8:20 or even around 8:14 (when a hijacking was already suspected), the fighters would have had another 15 to 21 minutes to reach New York City and decide what to do. But is it true that the FAA did in fact wait so long before notifying NORAD? As a matter of fact, a later ABC News report says that the FAA notified NORAD employee Lt. Colonel Dawne Deskins at 8:31 a.m., not 8:40. [ABC News, 9/11/02] A different version of that ABC report states, “Shortly after 8:30 a.m., behind the scenes, word of a possible hijacking reached various stations of NORAD.” [ABC News, 9/14/02] Even such a late notification around 8:30 would have given the fighters from Otis a fighting chance to reach Flight 175 before it crashed, especially since NORAD says the fighters only took six minutes to get ready and take off, instead of the maximum 15. [NORAD, 9/18/01]

NORAD claims that after being told of the hijacking at 8:40, it waited six minutes to give the scramble order to the Otis pilots. It then took another six minutes before the pilots took off. So, at 8:52, two fighters took off toward New York City. According to Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy, one of the pilots, before he took off a fellow officer had told him, “This looks like the real thing.” Duffy later said, “It just seemed wrong. I just wanted to get there. I was in full-blower all the way.” A NORAD commander has said the planes were stocked with extra fuel as well. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02] Full-blower meant the fighters were going as fast as they could go. An F-15 can travel over 1875 mph. [Air Force News, 7/30/97] Duffy later said, “As we’re climbing out, we go supersonic on the way, which is kind of nonstandard for us.” Their target destination was the airspace over Kennedy airport in New York City. [ABC News, 9/11/02]

So even if the late notification of 8:40 is true, these fighters still should have been able to reach New York City before Flight 175 as long as they traveled 1100 mph or faster—far below their maximum speed of 1875 mph. In fact, Major General Larry Arnold says they did head straight for New York City at about 1100 to 1200 mph. [MSNBC, 9/23/01 (C), Slate, 1/16/02] Yet, according to NORAD, the journey took 19 minutes, meaning the fighters traveled below 600 mph, and below supersonic speeds. [NORAD, 9/18/01] Major Gen. Paul Weaver, director of the Air National Guard, thus made the absurd statement, “The pilots flew ‘like a scalded ape,’ topping 500 mph but were unable to catch up to the airliner.” [Dallas Morning News, 9/16/01] At that speed, Flight 11 would have been traveling faster than the fighters!

Did the Otis Fighters Even Exist?
What is NORAD hiding with these conflicting notification times, and absurd “scalded ape” statements? Remarkably, it is possible that the story of fighters scrambling from Otis could be a complete fabrication. Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers was the acting head of the US military on 9/11 because the Chairman was out of contact on an international flight. [Washington Post, 1/27/02] Two days after 9/11, under oath and in front of a Congressional committee, Myers was asked when the order to scramble planes was first given. He responded, “That order, to the best of my knowledge, was after the Pentagon was struck [at 9:37].” [Myers Senate Confirmation Hearing, 9/13/01] If true, the claim that fighters were ordered scrambled at 8:46 is incorrect by almost one hour! This idea was not simply Myers’s confused recollection. The next day, NORAD spokesman Marine Corps Major Mike Snyder also claimed that no fighters were scrambled until after the Pentagon was hit. Only then did the military realize the scope of the attack and order fighters into the air. [Boston Globe, 9/15/01 (D)] NORAD’s current story of two fighters being scrambled at 8:46 was first reported on CBS Evening News on September 14, hours after Snyder agreed with Myers’s assertions. [CBS, 9/14/01] But even after that, in early October 2001, NORAD commander General Ralph Eberhart stated, “We did not anticipate this threat would take off from inside the United States and it would be a matter of double-digit minutes” to respond. [AP, 10/7/01] So in other words, even though NORAD fighters were supposed to be able to take to the sky within 15 minutes of being ordered to do so, NORAD claimed it was unable to respond unless it was warned more than an hour (or does he mean 99 minutes?) in advance!

United Airlines Flight 175
For the sake of argument, let’s assume that NORAD’s claim that fighters were scrambled at 8:46 is true. What else do we need to know about Flight 175, in order to judge the air defense response? On May 22, 2003, a NORAD spokesman claimed that the FAA notified NORAD that Flight 175 was “possibly hijacked” at 9:05, two minutes after it had crashed into the World Trade Center, and that its transponder was never turned off. [NORAD Testimony, 5/23/03] Both of these assertions contradict all previous post-9/11 reports, including NORAD’s earlier timeline. [NORAD, 9/18/01]

At 8:16 a.m., Flight 175 took off late, 16 minutes after both its scheduled departure and the departure of Flight 11. [CNN, 9/17/01, AP, 8/19/02] The hijacking also started much later than on Flight 11. Flight 175’s last routine communication occurred four seconds before 8:42. Exactly one minute later, a Boston flight controller said of the flight, “He’s off about 9 o’clock and about 20 miles looks like he’s heading southbound but there’s no transponder no nothing and no one’s talking to him.” [New York Times, 10/16/01 (B)] So, all at once flight control discovered the radio had been cut off, the transponder had been turned off, and the plane was seriously off course. The FAA immediately notified NORAD before the minute was out. NORAD’s own timeline, released one week after 9/11, states that NORAD was notified about this plane at 8:43. [NORAD, 9/18/01] Actually, notifying NORAD was unnecessary, because by this time NORAD technicians had their headsets linked to Boston flight control to hear about Flight 11, and so NORAD learned about Flight 175 at the same time Boston did. [Newhouse News, 1/25/02] If there was any doubt the plane was hijacked, that was removed five seconds after 8:44. A nearby airliner said to flight control about Flight 175, “I just picked up an ELT [emergency locator transmitter] on 121.5 it was brief but it went off.” [New York Times, 10/16/01 (B)] Clearly, NORAD’s latest claim that it was not notified until 9:05 is wildly incorrect. As for its recent claim that the transponder was never turned off, the above flight controller’s comment, “there’s no transponder no nothing,” shows how incorrect that is. But apparently, the transponder didn’t stay off for long. It was turned off for about 30 seconds, and then changed to a signal that was not designated for any plane on that day. [Newsday, 9/10/02] Ironically, this “allowed controllers to track the intruder easily...” [Washington Post, 9/17/01]

Both Flights 11 and 175 were never lost to Boston flight control’s radar. When Flight 11 turned its transponder off at 8:14, that only prevented Boston from determining the plane’s exact altitude, because they could still track the plane using primary radar. [Christian Science Monitor, 9/13/01, Newhouse News, 1/25/02] Boston flight controller Mark Hodgkins later said, “I watched the target of American 11 the whole way down.” [ABC, 9/6/02] At some point before the plane turned toward New York City at 8:28, the FAA had tagged Flight 11’s radar dot for easy visibility, and at American Airlines headquarters, “All eyes watched as the plane headed south.” [Wall Street Journal, 10/15/01] But apparently NORAD had different radar, and Boston had to periodically update it on Flight 11’s position by telephone until NORAD finally found it a few minutes before it crashed into the World Trade Center. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02, ABC News, 9/11/02, Newhouse News, 1/25/02]

So in the 18 minutes between the crash of Flight 11, many eyes watched their radars show Flight 175 inexorably making its way toward New York City, heading nearly 180 degrees away from its previous flight path. Also, “several minutes” after the first attack at 8:46, Boston flight control reported to NORAD that it was Flight 11 that had crashed into the World Trade Center. [New York Times, 9/13/01 (F), Newhouse News, 1/25/02] NORAD now claims it wasn’t notified about this until 9:05. [NORAD Testimony, 5/23/03]

Also “within minutes” of 8:46, two open telephone conference calls were established between the FAA, NORAD, the Secret Service, and a number of other government agencies. [FAA, 5/22/03, UPI, 5/22/03 (B)] Even Bush and Cheney were occasionally heard on these open lines. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02, CNN, 9/4/02, ABC News, 9/11/02] But between the crashes of Flights 11 and 175, not everyone who should have been informed actually was. Flight controllers in New York City later complained that Boston controllers didn’t give them a conclusive report of what happened to Flight 11 until a minute or two before Flight 175 crashed at 9:03. They also weren’t told there was a concern with Flight 175 until right before it crashed. [New York Times, 9/13/01 (F)] And despite so many agencies being in the know through the conference call, apparently no one thought to notify officials in New York City. As a result, from about 8:55 until shortly before the second crash, a public announcement was broadcast inside the South Tower of the World Trade Center, saying that the building was secure and that people could return to their offices. [USA Today, 9/3/02, New York Times, 9/11/02, click on interactive popup]

Even worse, the pilots flying toward New York City were poorly informed. One pilot, Major Daniel Nash, says he can’t recall actually being told of the Flight 11 crash. [Cape Cod Times, 8/21/02] Both pilots say they weren’t told about Flight 175 until after it had crashed. [ABC News, 9/11/02, ABC, 9/14/02] At no point in the day were these pilots given permission to shoot down any airliners. Nash points out that even if he had reached New York City before Flight 175, he couldn’t have shot it down because only the president could make that decision, and he was preoccupied with a classroom of children in Florida. [Cape Cod Times, 8/21/02]

American Airlines Flight 77
So clearly NORAD and the rest of the government has little to be proud of regarding Flights 11 and 175. With better communication, a good portion of the people inside the World Trade Center could have been warned in time to leave, and perhaps Flight 175 could have been prevented from hitting the South Tower altogether. But the response to Flight 77 was even worse.

Flight 77 took off from Dulles International Airport near Washington at 8:20, ten minutes after the scheduled departure time. [8:20, CNN, 9/17/01, Guardian, 10/17/01] Its last routine radio communication was made 51 seconds after 8:50, and then it failed to respond to a routine instruction. [New York Times, 10/16/01 (D)] According to a USA Today map, it likely had already turned about 90 degrees from its scheduled flight path by this time (see the flight path map above). According to the New York Times, “a few minutes” after 8:48, flight controllers learned that Flight 77 had been hijacked. [New York Times, 9/15/01 (C)] But, as with Flight 11, they clearly violated regulations and failed to immediately notify NORAD.

A few minutes later, Flight 77 began turning around over northeastern Kentucky, and eventually headed back toward Washington. [Washington Post, 9/12/01, Newsday, 9/23/01] At 8:56, Flight 77’s transponder signal was turned off. [Guardian, 10/17/01, Boston Globe, 11/23/01] The New York Times later pointed out that “by 8:56 a.m., it was evident that Flight 77 was lost.” Starting at 8:56, flight controllers repeatedly called for Flight 77 over the radio and received no reply. [New York Times, 10/16/01] Even though Flight 77 had already turned around before the transponder was turned off, flight controllers failed to notice that and continued to look for its signal further west, instead of east where it was headed. West Virginia flight controllers finally noticed it entering their airspace around 9:05. [Newsday, 9/23/01] But again, supposedly now both West Virginia and Washington flight control apparently failed to notify NORAD. In fact, if NORAD can be believed, the FAA didn’t notify NORAD until 9:24 or 9:25, and even then only suggested that it “may” have been hijacked! [NORAD, 9/18/01, AP, 8/19/02, Guardian, 10/17/01] That’s half an hour after the New York Times says the FAA decided Flight 77 had been hijacked!

This huge time gap was a contentious point in the May 2003 Independent Commission hearings. Jane Garvey, FAA Administrator on 9/11, claimed that the FAA notified NORAD well before 9:24. In a statement released after her testimony, the FAA claimed, “NORAD logs indicate that the FAA made formal notification about American Flight 77 at 9:24 a.m., but information about the flight was conveyed continuously during the phone bridges [between the FAA, NORAD, the Secret Service, and other agencies] before the formal notification.” [FAA, 5/22/03] A few days after 9/11, the New York Times reported, “During the hour or so that American Airlines Flight 77 was under the control of hijackers, up to the moment it struck the west side of the Pentagon, military officials in a command center on the east side of the building were urgently talking to law enforcement and air traffic control officials about what to do.” [New York Times, 9/15/01 (C)] This largely matches the FAA’s more recent claim that NORAD and other agencies knew about the hijacking of Flight 77 long before 9:24.

If this is true, NORAD is once again wildly incorrect with its estimates. Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon at 9:38. So, if NORAD did in fact learn of Flight 77’s hijacking around 8:51 when the FAA concluded it had been hijacked, it would have had about 47 minutes to get a plane over Washington. Even traveling at 1100 mph—the speed NORAD commander Larry Arnold says fighters traveled in making the longer journey to New York City earlier in the day—the F-16 fighters from Langley Air Force Base 129 miles away could have reached Washington in only seven minutes.

NORAD officials present a different account. They claim that at 9:09 a.m. NORAD ordered the F-16s at Langley Air Force Base to battle stations alert. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02] However, a pilot, code-named “Honey,” who was actually in one of the first planes to take off from Langley, later said the battle stations alert wasn’t sounded until 9:24. [Among the Heroes, by Jere Longman, 8/02, p. 64-65] 9:24 is also when NORAD was supposedly officially notified. NORAD claimed that three minutes later, three F-16s at Langley were scrambled to intercept Flight 77. Three minutes after that, at 9:30, these three fighters took off. [NORAD, 9/18/01] But once again, the recollection of “Honey” doesn’t jibe with NORAD’s timing. While he doesn’t give exact times, he describes a series of events lasting much longer than six minutes, including waiting from “five to ten minutes” between two of these events. [Among the Heroes, by Jere Longman, 8/02, pp. 64-65]

But again, even if we assume NORAD’s times are correct, the agency’s explanations don’t make sense. Even if the fighters left at 9:30, they should have been able to reach Washington one minute before Flight 77 crashed, if they traveled the same 1100 mph that the fighters traveling to New York City did. The maximum speed of an F-16 is a bit slower than that of the F-15s used near New York, but still a respectable 1500 mph. [AP, 6/16/00] One of the F-16 pilots, Major Dean Eckmann, said he was told before scrambling that the World Trade Center had been hit by a plane. [AP, 8/19/02 (C)] So, no doubt the pilots would have wanted to get to Washington quickly. But in their May 2003 testimony, NORAD officials said that afterburners were not used on these planes, even though the planes earlier in the day flew using their afterburners. They said these planes flew about 660 mph to Washington. [NORAD Testimony, 5/23/03] But if NORAD’s earlier timeline is to be believed, these fighters were still 105 miles away when Flight 77 crashed. [Newsday, 9/23/01, NORAD, 9/18/01] If so, that means they must have flown north 24 miles in 8 minutes—an average of only about 180 mph, not 660 mph!

Clearly that cannot be correct, and once again the testimonies of the pilots differ greatly from NORAD’s explanations. The pilot “Honey” claimed the F-16s were in fact flying toward New York City, not Washington. They were 30 or 40 miles to the east of Washington, not south of it, when they saw a black column of smoke coming from the city. They then headed to Washington instead. [Among the Heroes, by Jere Longman, 8/02, p. 76] By contrast, two of the pilots have claimed their destination was always Washington [ABC News, 9/11/02, AP, 8/13/02 (C)], while NORAD officer Major James Fox claims he dispatched the fighters without any target. [Newhouse News, 1/25/02] So the issue certainly is confused.

Interestingly, at the May 2003 hearing, NORAD officials claimed that the fighters from Langley were sent to fly over the Atlantic Ocean instead of heading directly toward Washington. [NORAD Testimony, 5/23/03] This would jibe with “Honey” ’s account of the fighters being too far east. NORAD officials admitted that had the fighters traveled faster and headed directly toward Washington, they could have theoretically arrived there before Flight 77. But NORAD claims the fighters had to fly over the ocean because NORAD didn’t have jurisdiction over land. [NORAD Testimony, 5/23/03] Said NORAD Commander Major General Larry Arnold: “Anything that takes off in the United States is considered a law enforcement issue—- or was considered a law enforcement issue, prior to Sept. 11.” [AP, 5/23/03 (C)] Arnold added, “And, of course, [the fighters were] out over water because our mission, unlike law enforcement’s mission is to protect things coming towards the United States.” [NORAD Testimony, 5/23/03] This makes no sense, especially given that earlier in the day fighters flew over land to reach New York City, and that NORAD officials decided to override official regulations from the first word of the first hijacking. Were they hoping the hijacked planes would oblige them and join their fighters out over the ocean? If we add “Honey” ’s account suggesting that the Langley fighters actually took off later than admitted and headed toward New York City, and if we believe NORAD’s original explanation that no fighters at all scrambled until after the Pentagon was hit, then we can at least see an explanation as to why the Langley fighters would have been headed toward New York City. But the level of incompetence this implies is breathtaking.

Other Planes, Other Options
The failure to shoot down Flight 77 is even more glaring when one realizes that NORAD didn’t have to only use planes from Langley or Otis. Shortly after Flight 175 crashed, it became obvious that the nation was under attack. As a result, calls from fighter units started “pouring into NORAD and sector operations centers, asking, ‘What can we do to help?’” The Air National Guard commander in Syracuse, New York, told Colonel Robert Marr, in charge of NORAD’s Northeastern US sector, “Give me 10 min. and I can give you hot guns. Give me 30 min. and I’ll have heat-seeker [missiles]. Give me an hour and I can give you slammers [Amraams].” Marr replied, “I want it all.” [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02] Supposedly, Marr also said, “Get to the phones. Call every Air National Guard unit in the land. Prepare to put jets in the air. The nation is under attack.” [Newhouse News, 1/25/02] Another NORAD commander, Major General Eric Findley, claims he had his staff immediately order as many fighters in the air as possible. [Ottawa Citizen, 9/11/02] But the facts don’t fit the rhetoric. Note that Marr’s answer to Syracuse meant that no fighter would take off for an hour, when in fact Syracuse could have had planes with some weapons in the sky in ten minutes. Even if fighters didn’t take off from Syracuse until 9:20, that still would have been enough time for those fighters to reach Washington before Flight 77 did, if they had been ordered to protect that city.

Another account says, “By 10:01 a.m., the command center began calling several bases across the country for help.” [Toledo Blade, 12/9/01] This fits better with what actually happened. A base in Toledo was one of those called at that time, and it appears to have been the first base outside of Otis, Langley, or Andrews to send up any fighters, which they did at 10:16 (the situation at Andrews will be discussed below). Syracuse may have been next, finally putting fighters in the air at 10:44. [Toledo Blade, 12/9/01] If so many bases were in communication with NORAD right after 9:03, then why were no fighters put into the air until so long afterward?

A Stand Down Order?
Could it be that instead of ordering all those fighters into the air, other bases were actually ordered NOT to scramble their fighters? According to Time magazine, at 9:26 a.m., FAA Administrator Jane Garvey “almost certainly after getting an okay from the White House, initiated a national ground stop, which forbids takeoffs and requires planes in the air to get down as soon as reasonable. The order, which has never been implemented since flying was invented in 1903, applied to virtually every single kind of machine that can takeoff — civilian, military, or law enforcement.” Note the inclusion of military planes. Military and law enforcement flights were allowed to resume taking off at 10:31 a.m. A limited number of military flights were allowed to fly during this ban, but the FAA won’t reveal details. [Time, 9/14/01] USA Today later claimed that it was Ben Sliney who made this decision, and without consulting his superiors. This would be even more remarkable, because it was Sliney’s first day on the job as the FAA’s National Operations Manager, “the chess master of the air traffic system.” [USA Today, 8/13/02]

Why Not Andrews Air Force Base?
As previously mentioned, it appeared that Andrews Air Force Base had “combat ready” fighters “in the highest possible state of readiness.” This is not surprising, given that Andrews is the airport typically used by Air Force One and foreign dignitaries when flying to Washington. Furthermore, at the time of the first World Trade Center crash, three F-16s assigned to Andrews were flying a training mission in North Carolina, 207 miles away from Washington. These fighters were only twenty miles further from Washington than the planes in Massachusetts ordered to New York were from that city. Yet it took about an hour more before they were recalled. They landed at Andrews at some point after Flight 77 had crashed into the Pentagon at 9:38. One of the fighters, piloted by Major Billy Hutchison, still had enough fuel to immediately take off again but the other two needed to refuel. Hutchison supposedly took off with no weapons. “Hutchison was probably airborne shortly after the alert F-16s from Langley arrive over Washington, although 121st FS pilots admit their timeline-recall ‘is fuzzy.’” [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/02] If NORAD’s timeline for those other fighters is correct, this means Hutchison didn’t leave Andrews until after 9:49. Again, one must wonder why these planes weren’t recalled from their training much earlier. And why, even so much later, wasn’t Hutchison with his adequate fuel ordered directly to Washington’s skies, which was still unprotected?

The answer appears to be that NORAD only wanted to use fighters from the two bases on the Northeast Coast that they directly controlled, even if there were other bases or fighters in the air that were closer. But there was no reason for this. We know details of a 1999 fighter scramble, because famous golfer Payne Stewart was aboard a runaway Learjet. With the pilot unconscious, NORAD used fighters from a number of bases outside NORAD’s official seven bases to follow the plane as it crossed over several states before finally crashing. [ABC News, 10/25/99] But on 9/11, NORAD seemed determined not to use fighters from other bases such as Andrews, even though Andrews was only ten miles from Washington. Andrews personnel learned about the national emergency through news coverage, and then a pilot called a friend in the Secret Service for more information. A few minutes after the second crash, it was the Secret Service, not NORAD, who called Andrews and asked them to get fighters ready. Again, a few minutes after the Pentagon crash at 9:38, it was the Secret Service who called Andrews, and said the fighters needed to “Get in the air now!” [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/02]

Yet, despite Andrews’ claim to have “combat ready” fighters “in the highest possible state of readiness” when the “Get in the air now!” command came, the fighters still were not fully ready to take off. They had ammunition for “hot” guns. But AIM-9 missiles were located in a bunker on the other side of the base, and even though base commanders began the process of loading them shortly after 9:00, they still weren’t finished until about 40 minutes later. The next two fighters to take off from Andrews after Major Billy Hutchison were only armed only with “hot” guns and 511 rounds of “TP”—nonexplosive training rounds. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/02] Even though the Secret Service and NORAD had long been sharing a conference call by this time, NORAD officials claim they remained unaware that the Secret Service ordered any planes into the air from Andrews. [NORAD Testimony, 5/23/03]

Flight 93
Flight 93 had to wait in a line of planes before it could take off, delaying its departure about 40 minutes until 8:42 a.m. [Newsweek, 9/22/01, USA Today, 8/12/02] As a result, it was the last of the four planes to be hijacked. The FAA told NORAD at 9:16 that Flight 93 was hijacked [CNN, 9/17/01, NORAD Testimony, 5/23/03], but it’s not clear why they believed this because the transponder wasn’t turned off until about 9:30 or 9:40 and the flight didn’t go off course until much later. [9:30, MSNBC, 9/3/02, 9:40, CNN, 9/17/01] (Edited transcripts of cockpit voice recordings have been released for every plane but Flight 93. [New York Times, 10/16/01, New York Times, 10/16/01 (B), New York Times, 10/16/01 (C), New York Times, 10/16/01 (D)])

Much of the timing surrounding Flight 93 has not been released, or is in dispute. For instance, NORAD maintains the plane crashed at 10:03 [NORAD, 9/18/01, NORAD Testimony, 5/23/03], even though a seismic study commissioned by the US Army determined the plane crashed five seconds after 10:06. [US Army Authorized Seismic Study, Philadelphia Daily News, 9/16/02] Even more mysterious is when, or even if, fighters flew toward Flight 93. NORAD’s first timeline failed to give this information, except to say that a fighter was 100 miles or 11 minutes away when Flight 93 crashed into the Pennsylvania countryside. [NORAD, 9/18/01] That means the fighter was traveling about 550 mph. As with the fighters going after Flight 77, that seems strangely slow, considering the first fighters dispatched to New York City an hour earlier flew twice as fast.

That statistic also means that the fighters had only gone about 80 miles from Washington when Flight 93 crashed. If we assume the slow 550 mph speed was correct and constant, that means the fighters left Washington about eight minutes before the crash, or 9:58.

Think about the implications of that. Even before Flight 93 was hijacked at 9:16, the nations’ defenses were in an uproar, with base commanders all over the country calling in, asking to help. Yet, incredibly, about 42 minutes passed before even anyone sent any fighters toward the hijacked Flight 93!

Was NORAD Merely Grossly Incompetent?
NORAD seems to have no respect for the truth. In late 2001, Major General Larry Arnold wrote how NORAD’s 9/11 response was “immediate” and “impressive.” Moving into outright fiction, Arnold claimed, “we were able to identify, track and escort suspected hijacked aircraft after the initial attacks,”“our reaction time outpaced the process in some instances,”“our well-practiced rapid response capability may very well have prevented additional surprise attacks on the American homeland saving countless lives,” and so on. [American Defender, 2001] With Arnold sitting next to him, Major General Craig McKinley admitted in the May 2003 hearings, “We had not positioned prior to September 11, 2001, for the scenario that took place that day.” [New Jersey Star-Ledger, 5/24/03] “McKinley admitted that NORAD was utterly unprepared for the attack.” [UPI, 5/23/03] He called NORAD’s 9/11 stance “a Cold War vestige.” [New Jersey Star-Ledger, 5/24/03] NORAD now claims to be so incompetent that they had to rely on the FAA for all radar information, and even had to go through the FAA to communicate with their own pilots. [Knight Ridder, 5/24/03]

NORAD’s explanations about 9/11 have never made sense, and their new eagerness to be seen as an incompetent “Cold War vestige” is equally suspect. NORAD officials brazenly lied throughout their testimony. In the new NORAD timeline they presented, they even claimed that CNN first began showing images of the World Trade Center on fire at 8:57 when it is easily verifiable that CNN began doing this at 8:48. [CNN, 9/11/01, NORAD Testimony, 5/23/03] Like their many other lies, one can see how this lie serves to cover up the extent of their failure. Unfortunately, the Independent Commission did not require that testimony be given under oath, so these officials cannot be charged with perjury.

One Toronto Star columnist wrote in May 2003, “The great majority of people, sickened and overwhelmed by the horror of the attacks, unquestioningly accepts the White House version [of what happened on 9/11]. Many thousands, however, are patiently stitching together the documented evidence and noting the huge holes in the fabric of that official story.” [Toronto Star, 5/18/03] A Sarasota Herald-Tribune columnist recently called the “restrained—even failed—standard US military air defense protocols while the attacks were occurring” a “real mystery” that deserves a serious investigation. [Sarasota Herald-Tribune, 5/20/03] But most of the mainstream media doesn’t appear at all interested in these mysteries.

Given the many warnings that came before 9/11, it is not only NORAD that deserves blame for the utter failure to defend the skies on 9/11. Thousands of lives could have been saved if standard procedures were properly followed. Perhaps only those in the World Trade Center’s North Tower need have died, if the FAA and NORAD did their job properly. No wonder the government passed a law making it difficult for relatives of the 9/11 terrorists to sue anyone but the terrorists. [Los Angeles Times, 1/17/02] There has been no accountability for all these failures and needless deaths. There still has not been one demonstrable firing or punishment for any government employee because of 9/11. Many unanswered questions remain, and are likely to remain unanswered until people put pressure on the media and government to finally stop covering up what happened on 9/11.